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Conventionalist’s Perspectives on the Political 
Economy of Law. An Introduction 
Rainer Diaz-Bone, Claude Didry & Robert Salais∗ 
Abstract: »Konventionentheoretische Perspektiven auf die politische Ökonomie 
des Rechts. Eine Einleitung«. This introduction and the contributions of this HSR 
Special Issue “Conventions and Law from a Historical Perspective” present the 
conception and analysis of law from the perspective of the French institutionalist 
approach of the economics of convention (EC). From the pragmatic viewpoint of 
EC, law is regarded as an institution through which actors “identify” the situation 
in which they interact regularly. Law can be seen as a “guide” in the coordina-
tions in which actors are engaged and committed. So law is not conceived as 
simple external constraint for economic action because law has to be interpreted 
and mobilized by competent actors. Therefore, EC understands law as internal to 
situational coordinations. From its beginnings (three decades ago), EC has includ-
ed the analysis of law into its institutional research. Also from its beginnings, EC 
has developed a transdisciplinary approach, refusing the traditional “division of 
law” between history, sociology, economics, and law science. The introduction 
presents some main concepts (as convention of State) and positions of EC in the 
analysis of law. This introduction also relates EC’s perspective to neoliberalism, 
economic neo-institutionalism, new historical institutionalism, and the Weberian 
sociology of law. The contributions of this HSR Special Issue are presented. They 
cover overviews about EC’s research on (mainly economic) law, empirical applica-
tions, and theoretical considerations about law from a conventionalist perspective. 
Keywords: Economics of convention, institutions, law, economic action, neolib-
eralism, economic neo-institutionalism, new historical institutionalism, conven-
tions of State, sociology of law. 
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1.  Introduction 
The transdisciplinary approach of the économie des conventions (economics of 
convention, in short EC) has been established over the last three decades. From 
its beginning, EC has introduced a pragmatic as well as a historical perspective 
on economic coordination and economic institutions. In France, this approach is a 
prominent part of the so-called new social sciences (Diaz-Bone and Salais 2011). 
Within three decades, many researchers have contributed to EC, and in 
France, one can nowadays speak of a second generation. For one decade now, 
the international recognition for EC has been rising, and in many European 
countries, researchers apply this approach now in their analyses. So today, EC 
has internationalized as an approach in the fields of economic history, econom-
ic sociology, historical political economy, and others. It is important to high-
light this special integrative character of the EC. It is transdisciplinary in char-
acter – bringing together economists, historians, sociologists, and statisticians. 
And it does not separate the historical analysis of law from the study of other 
spheres (Bessy 2014). EC is one of the few approaches in the field of political 
economy which kept and developed an integrated non-reductionist historical 
perspective on the complex relation of law, economy, State, and competent 
actors in situations of coordination and (law) production (Diaz-Bone 2011, 
2015 in this HSR Special Issue; Didry 2012, 2013; Bessy 2013).1 
From its beginning, EC has also included law in its analysis. Examples are: 
the collective study about the invention of unemployment by Robert Salais, 
Bénédicte Reynaud and Nicolas Baverez (1999); the study about the invention 
of collective contracts in France done by Claude Didry (2002); or the analysis 
of the contractualization of labor relations (Bessy 2007).2 All these studies and 
contributions conceive law as an institution which has to be interpreted and 
mobilized by socio-historical actors in situations.3 From the perspective of EC, 
actors have to make sense of law, interpret its meaning, and pragmatically 
apply it as institution. While the field of law has its own autonomy of devel-
opment (see below), law as an institution is not to be conceived as an external 
constraint to action and coordination. EC conceives law (as any institution) as 
internal to action and coordination open to interpretive and situational adoption 
by competent actors. Consequently, for the historical analysis of law, EC ana-
lyzes the meaning of law from the standpoint of coordinating actors referring 
their action to conventions of coordination. Actors should be understood not 
                                                             
1  See also the contributions in Favereau 2010 and in Bessy, Delpeuch and Pélisse 2011. 
2  See also as a resource the contributions of EC in the 2012 special issue “Conventions, law 
and economy” in the online journal Economic Sociology – European Electronic Newsletter, 
ed. Diaz-Bone. 
3  See for the differences between institutions and conventions Salais 1998 and Diaz-Bone 
2012. 
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only as the so-called “economic,” “social,” or “political” actors, but as including 
ordinary persons at work or not, professional lawyers, experts, civil servants, and 
so on, depending on the situations at stake.  
EC assumes that law is a category through which actors identify the situa-
tion in which they interact regularly; in a way, law can be seen as a guide with-
in the coordinations in which actors are committed. Thus, dynamics can 
emerge from insensible changes, hard to perceive for the actors themselves. 
But, from a historical perspective, such a change is also hard to perceive for the 
historian. One solution is to see law as a means for the expression of disruptive 
situations in the conventions, opening to sues, negotiations or, at least debates, 
as an interrogation by the actors themselves on the problems encountered by 
the coordination implying to make the conventions explicit, to confront several 
horizons of meaning in order to express the problem and to find a solution. 
Thus, judicial decisions or agreements produced in a negotiation can be inter-
esting material for the investigation of conventions and of the dynamics.  
Reciprocally, jurisprudence, as a set of “remarkable” decisions or agree-
ments, is a material used by lawyers to assess the meaning of law by knowing 
how law is mobilized by the actors, and in what way this mobilization leads to 
enriched interpretations of law. It opens an investigation of the specific dynam-
ic of law itself by exploring its meanings from the perspective of an “open 
texture” of the rules (MacCormick 1978, 2005), and by contributing to the 
renewing of the legal categories. It leads to “juridical work” (Didry 2002) in 
which public action and the State are seen as policy makers constraining indi-
vidual behaviour by their decisions in order to restore an equilibrium or to 
achieve an optimum. Public action cannot be seen as a simple decision chang-
ing by constraint and incentive of individual behaviors in the search of a re-
newed equilibrium, as it is from the point of view of either social choice theory 
in economy or, more generally, in political science. It has to be taken as a pro-
duction of renewed rules that influence current conventions by bringing to the 
actors new rights, and, as categories, enable actor to shed new lights on their 
situations of coordination.  
From an EC perspective, history lies – in a way – at the confluence of these 
two dynamics by taking into account the presence of the law, and thus often of 
the State in the course of the conventions. It means that, on the one hand, taking 
institutions seriously, one cannot reduce economic history to the macroeconomic 
performance of national economies as in the perspective of Douglass North 
(1990, 2005), and has to take the way actors in specific conventions use and 
interpret law into account. On the other hand, it also means that law is not the 
result or the reflection of economic situations and dynamics taken as an explica-
tive variable of law “in last instance” (according to what we could call “economi-
cism” either Marxist or neoclassical). 
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2.  A Renewal of Economic History 
2.1   A Classical Division of Labor between Economic History, 
Sociology and Law 
From a classical perspective, law is seen as the consequence of an economic 
development that creates problems affecting the reproduction of the system. It is 
meant to help overcome what could be called negative externalities such as the 
misery of the working class, or the threats on the market mechanisms issued by 
the concentration of firms. Thus, economic history establishes facts such as tech-
nical innovations, growth of the GDP, or the concentration process. Labor law, 
for instance, appears as a regulation reducing the exploitation of the workforce, 
through limiting work duration, stabilizing wages, and creating security nets such 
as social insurances in case of illness, work accident, or unemployment. It brings 
an answer to the “social question” by introducing new guarantees based on the 
wage (Castel 2003). The increasing purchasing power of the workers leads to a 
new equilibrium, in a Keynesian economic perspective.  
In the same way, antitrust legislation issued at the beginning of the 20th cen-
tury in the US is conceived as a tool orienting the economic development by 
maintaining competition. It has successively tackled cartels on prices, vertical 
concentration and horizontal concentration, orienting the growth of the firms 
toward financial conglomerates (Fligstein 1990). 
2.2  The Elimination of Law by the Neo-Liberalism of the 1990s:  
A Theoretical and Political Orientation 
This classical division of labor has been under attack by the new economic 
Chicago school.4 Theoretically, law is conceived as a state regulation perturb-
ing the price mechanism and overall economy efficiency through artificially high 
transaction costs. The Coase theorem establishes the higher efficiency of an 
amicable arrangement over sues and, of course, law as a manifestation of the 
State (Coase 1960, 1988). It grounds the law and economics perspective devel-
oped by Coase (1960) and Posner (1973), for whom the litigation in society must 
be handled in favor of economic efficiency instead of searching justice through 
law implementation. The economics of transaction costs is at the core of this 
neo-liberal attack against every State activity in pushing economic rationality 
and the need for a control of individual misbehavior to a new step. The basis of 
the transaction cost approach is an extreme individualist rationality conceived 
as leading to individual guile transcending any common good, and implying 
sanction mechanisms against this permanent risk in the coordinated activities. 
                                                             
4  See the contributions in Mirowski and Plehwe 2009. 
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But instead of justifying a monitoring activity of the State to address this threat 
on any coordination, individual guile invalidates the efficiency of the market 
mechanism itself, and explains the success of organizations as a form of endoge-
nous control of the individuals. The individual guile as a market failure threat is 
finding, through the spontaneous economic mechanism, a balance between con-
tractual and organizational governance. Thus, the economy has to be freed from 
any external regulation, as it has its own that leads to an optimal efficiency.  
The ultimate value – if it can be called a value – is efficiency of the whole 
economy where the spontaneous share between market and organization is able 
to contain individual guile through internal coercion mechanism. Even compe-
tition regulation becomes harmful as it prevents a spontaneous, and more effi-
cient, balance between contractual and organizational governance. The main 
State policy through military coups or democratic elections, from Pinochet to 
Reagan and Thatcher, is to eliminate any State actions up to the antitrust regu-
lations (Mirowski and Plehwe 2009; Davis 2010). The convention of the State 
that has to be shared between actors is paradoxical, for the only admissible 
State’s action should be devoted to eliminate itself: in the terms of Storper and 
Salais, to be “absent,” though sometimes terribly present. This political turn 
marks the victory of the new Chicago school over the old one, and challenges 
the “ordoliberal” doctrine (Salais 2013). Ordo-liberalism was born in the 1930s 
in Germany and was applied in the postwar period, after the implication of the 
“Konzerne” (group of companies) in the Nazi regime was denounced. Ordo-
liberalism, differentiated from Hayekian conceptions, pleas in favor of the 
freedom of exchange between participants to the market, and is more than pure 
competition. For ordo-liberals, the State should impose rules maintaining some 
equality between actors (hence against trusts), not only for economic reasons, 
but also for the sake of democracy. But, after the neo-liberal turn, democracy 
itself seems to be an obstacle for the maximization of efficiency (Salais 2013).  
One can conceive this victory of neo-liberalism over liberalism and ordo-
liberalism as a global trend of the privatization of former public owned eco-
nomic institutions.5 Neo-liberalism also tries to privatize law and to privatize 
the control of the economy as a formerly public sphere. Christian Bessy (2012) 
has demonstrated how the upcoming of big law companies supports this trend. 
Thereby, law as a common institution which is accessible to everyone – and 
which is the sphere of public control of the economy – is systematically un-
dermined by private companies.  
Outside a political project, the Coasian doctrine (at the core of the new Chi-
cago school) also offers a base for a historical explanation of the economic 
                                                             
5  Here, we have a kind of “convergence of system” between – on the one side – post-socialist 
countries where the oligarchic elites privatize the enterprises which were built up in the 
foregoing socialist era and – on the other side – capitalist elites privatizing the legal foun-
dations of the economic sphere. 
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dynamics owing to the Williamson’s analysis of the multiple governances that 
provides economic efficiency. The development of economic organizations can 
be seen as a spontaneous economic reordering, the antitrust regulation did not 
block. Such a doctrine challenges the classical economic history and its echoes 
in sociology and law, by giving the priority to independent economic mecha-
nisms outside and even against any State activity. 
2.3  The Contradiction of Neo-Institutionalism 
Neo-institutionalism has been presented by Victor Nee (2005) as an innovative 
synthesis between neo-institutionalist economics and economic sociology, 
emerging from the idea of a “social construction” of markets and the concept of 
“embeddedness” issued by Granovetter (1985). Economists as Williamson have 
shown the limits of market transactions for the control of individual guile, and the 
merits of the organizational governance mechanisms in an optimization efficien-
cy program (Williamson 1985, 2000). In an apparent opposition, the concept of 
embeddedness was central in the functioning of market mechanism. Network 
analysis provides instrumentation to identify social communities based on “strong 
ties,” in order to isolate the individuals able to connect different communities, 
create “weak ties”, and exploit the loyalty of individuals embedded in communi-
ties. Embeddedness can be interpreted as a spontaneous structural control over 
the individuals exerted through moral pressure, equivalent to the price sanctions 
of the organization in Williamson’s perspective. What is institutional here is the 
finding of alternatives to market mechanism that support it. But State and law, as 
its production, disappear behind internal sanctions, either economic or moral. The 
true actors of the neo-institutionalist world are the “entrepreneurs,” either as 
organizers or as bridge between network communities. State activity is dissolved 
in the competition of networks put in motion by “entrepreneurs,” and seems to be 
useless in a historical explanation focusing on the only action of these modern 
heroes. Thus, the active dimension of institutions, as the act to institute, vanishes 
behind spontaneous structural changes, and the market transactions are natural-
ized, even as “embedded.” 
2.4  The NHI Solution 
Though often entangled in the neo-institutionalist constellation North has 
brought a new dimension based on the “challenge of Polanyi” (North 1977). In 
highlighting the “disembedding move” identified by Polanyi’s Great Trans-
formation (Polanyi 2001), North underlines the historical emergence of the 
market seen as a challenge that Polanyi has not addressed. The move toward a 
self-regulated market is seen by Polanyi as the result of a State action, namely 
the enclosure process, but supposes that transactions function spontaneously in 
transfers of property rights outside any State intervention. It leads North to 
redefine institutions not as structural envelopes constraining individuals’ be-
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havior, but as frameworks constraining individuals’ opportunities in interac-
tions (North 1990, 2005). Thus, the main transaction tool – contract – is not a 
simple promise, but is first grounded in commercial codes of conduct, and then 
in law elaborated by the State, especially after the parliament’s victory during 
the Glorious Revolution in UK. It enables the new historical institutionalism 
(NHI) to analyze the place of the State in fixing the “rules of the game” played 
by the economic actors, firstly in national contexts.6 It explains why NHI is 
focused on national economies’ performances as spurs of different modes of 
communication between the “actors” and the State.7 The “institutional matrix” 
defined by the complex “State-economic actors” explains the evolution of laws 
as the “rules of the game,” but remains in fact a black box in which actors 
interact with the State through lobbies symbolized by the American system. 
Economic actors are mostly organizations represented by entrepreneurs, they 
run business or cooperatives and trade associations. Thus, organization is an-
other black box where coordination problems between the individuals are sup-
posed to be solved or denied. 
3.  The Originality of EC in the Treatment of Law and the 
State 
EC offers a wide range of researches starting from the coordination of the 
individuals in interaction, opening the black box of organization or community. 
But, even if “EC postulates a pragmatist competence of actors to coordinate 
their interactions to achieve a common goal” (Diaz-Bone and Salais 2011, 8), it 
addresses law and the State alongside different formulas. 
3.1  Law as an Object of the Civic World: Boltanski and Thévenot 
In the best-known version of EC, Boltanski and Thévenot (2006) consider inter-
action as ongoing coordination threatened by critiques. The continuity of coordi-
nation then suggests the reference of the actors to a “superior common principle” 
enabling coordination to resist the critique, i.e. the risk of demobilization of the 
actors and of disaggregation of the interaction. It means that interaction oscillates 
between continuity regimes – close to routines, but where actions remain aligned 
with the world into which actors situate them – and disputes in justice implying 
justifications and evolution of the common principle grounding the coordination. 
Thus, disputes appear as privileged moments to analyze the principles in compe-
tition, and the way they recompose to resist critiques.  
                                                             
6  On the difference between NHI and what Nee calls “neo-institutionalism” see Didry and 
Vincensini 2009. 
7  See for further critique on NHI Diaz-Bone and Salais 2011. 
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The juridical dimension is one of the multiple possibilities of opening a 
“dispute” through the mobilization of courts so that jurisdictions are a good 
place to see the confrontation of argumentations expressing the several princi-
ples in balance. It enables the formalization of judgments in order to operate 
more informally in the daily interactions (Thévenot 1992). A good example of 
this approach can be found in the research of Chateauraynaud (1991) on the 
malpractices handled by the French labor courts (Conseils de prud’hommes). 
Jurisdictions are the field of an explicit confrontation when “affairs” take a 
certain extent, but remain external to the multiple principles shared by the 
actors. They become a frame for the expression of “disputes” without consider-
ing their relation to the State, and pave the way for renewed “compromises” 
between the orders of worth identified by the authors without considering the 
effects of the justice decision, i.e. the mandate addressed to the power forces in 
order to restore the situation as it should have been according to the laws.  
The power of the State is taken as having a specific order of worth in which 
people are ordered according to their reputation following Hobbes’ conception: 
it has to be seen with Elias’ “Court society” in French absolutism (Elias 1983). 
Law finds a place in another world, the civic one, as an instrument of control of 
the interaction or a levee for the critique from this world. But it remains exter-
nal to the other worlds, such as the commercial world based upon an incorpo-
rated ability to contract or the industrial world based on organizational rules 
established by the engineers. 
3.2  Conventions of the State (Salais) 
Another EC approach can be found in Robert Salais’ analysis of the unem-
ployment (Salais, Baverez and Reynaud 1999), going back to research on social 
classification and categorization in which EC originates (Desrosières 2011a). 
Social classification and categorization are part of the work of statistics, as the 
need for knowledge on society for the State’s sake; Alain Desrosières (2010, 
2011b) has shown etymology’s proxy between State and statistics. Interaction 
and coordination are to be found not only in economic activities, but also in the 
State’s organisms where the economic activities are analyzed and observed in 
order to identify new categories for census and elaborate public actions upon 
the data gathered. This conception of the State appears close to the Durkheim-
ian conception of the State as “the social brain,” evolving from the reflection 
on economic interaction. One of the first occurrences of the notion of “conven-
tion” is to be found in the “Keynesian convention of State” (Salais, Baverez 
and Reynaud 1999), emerging from the identification of unemployment as an 
economic phenomenon and leading to policies aiming at “full employment.”  
Through the intervention of the State, these categories impact economic in-
teractions as cognitive tools for the actors to analyze their situation of action in 
order to benefit from public compensation in the case of unemployment or 
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social security. They are institutions as they institute actors as wage-earners 
and unemployed persons, and can then orient economic conventions towards 
new “worlds of production.” But the action of these categories is not mechani-
cal, and corresponds to a complex process between economic conventions and 
what Storper and Salais (1997) consider to be “State conventions.” The change 
of State conventions is anchored in general crisis that derives from specific 
problems of coordination emerging in economic situations such as in firms’ 
restructuring (Salais 1992). It impacts these concrete situations through new 
frames and resources which may or may not be mobilized by actors in the 
economic conventions in which they participate. In conceiving several “State’s 
conventions,” which are revealed in general crisis, Storper and Salais (1997) 
introduce another level of uncertainty in economic activities which opens a 
diversity of possible economic developments. If State intervention can be seen 
as a form of “State convention,” the “corrective state,” economic criticisms of 
this intervention as in the case of law and economics or of neoliberalism can be 
integrated as the “absent State convention.” The “situated State convention” 
can be seen as a possible expression of “EC’s politics” in searching for public 
tools enabling people to deal with their specific coordination problems in their 
“concrete” economic situation. 
3.3  EC and the Weberian Sociology of Law 
If law can be conceived as a form of these social categories elaborated by pub-
lic organisms, it implies considering other dimensions of such categories. The 
first one is the effect of law in the current interactions, not only as a regulation, 
i.e. as some direct intervention of state agencies, for example police or inspec-
tors, but also as a reference, a frame qualifying the relations between the per-
sons involved and defining the situation in which they act. This dimension 
prevails in the case of the contract or the society, specifying what type of con-
tracts (commercial, labor, sale, rent contract) or what type of societies (associa-
tion, civil society or corporation) people refer to. It could be called a “horizon-
tal” effect of law, i.e. the way people refer to it in the relation with one another.  
The second dimension could be characterized by the instituting function of 
law after the situation is qualified, i.e. the position assumed by the people in the 
relation. For example, the employment contract leads to the identification of an 
employee and an employer, the corporation to the identification of a board and 
of the CEO, etc.  
The third dimension corresponds to the mobilization of law in courts, seen 
as a step in a “dispute,” but which also implies a juridical qualification of the 
contentious affair most of the time. The mobilization of the law is an action of 
a person involved in an economic convention, which expresses the need for an 
expression of the coordination problem encountered in the convention.  
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The fourth dimension is the judicial decision, settling the affair submitted to 
the judge. But it opens also the possibility for one of the parties to request the 
use of police force for the execution of the decision. It means that law is not 
only the expression of what could be called, in a Bourdieusian perspective, the 
symbolic violence monopolized by the State, but implies the use of the force 
also monopolized by the State (Bourdieu 2014).  
Law – as a reference for the actors in economic conventions – implies a lot 
of people in its elaboration, its current use, its judicial mobilization and its 
judicial implementation at the request of the parties. The Weberian approach is 
useful to analyze these several dimensions in which law is entangled (Weber 
2013).8  
1) The distinction between the juridical and the sociological points of view on 
law means that lawyers do not monopolize the knowledge of juridical rules, 
but that every individual is interested – potentially or actually – in law mat-
ters. Ordinary people, Weber says, reconstruct juridical rules as “maxims of 
action” (“Handlungsmaximen,” Weber 1977) in the situation they act. He 
takes the example of a house owner expecting property law to provide a 
good argument in court to get the neighbor’s chimney down for hiding his 
access to the sun. Law can thus identify a trouble in the convention and be 
used to convince the judge to deliver a decision that remedies this trouble. 
Then, the judge is expected to be uncorrupted, i.e. assessing the situation in 
the “interest of law,” under the control of the jurisdictional system and in 
coherence with the “juridical point of view” developed by law professors.  
2) This implies an organization of justice and legislation in relation to the State 
as a monopoly of the physical force. The State, through the presence of po-
licemen (Weber calls them as “spiked helmets”), is required for the possibil-
ity of peaceful economic transactions. It is required for the execution of the 
judicial decisions, for the guaranteeing of the situation of judges as public 
servants, and even for the stabilization of a law professors’ corporation.  
3) This organization means that law creates the expectation of a State’s inter-
vention by the ordinary people in contentious situations; it means that the 
State is conceived as present in every interactions.9 
4) But this organization, based on the action of human beings, with different 
values, is evolving. Firstly, it is the result of a historical evolution seen by 
Weber as a dynamic of “formal rationalization” of rules and of jurisdictions. 
Secondly, this organization evolves, through the lawsuits of the people, the 
new laws adopted by the parliament (in a democratic regime) and the reor-
ganization of jurisdiction. For example, the creation of a specific jurisdiction 
for labor litigation can alter the formal character of justice in underlining the 
                                                             
8  See Diaz-Bone 2011 for the relation of Weber’s work and EC. 
9  The same idea of the ”presence“ of the State in situations of coordination is developed in 
Storper and Salais. 
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question of the “uses” planned by the law itself (for example the article 1135 
of the French Civil Code). The legal establishment of collective agreements 
can also provide mixt commissions to settle issues on their implementations.  
5) Thus, Weber suggests that formal rationalization is not the ultimate organi-
zation of law: law can evolve within certain limits to less abstract rationali-
ty, in giving more space to concrete or material facts or reversely in focus-
ing on formalization of the affairs. Law can then be understood as a State 
production, along several orientations established by the legislative power 
but also explored by the affairs submitted to justice. This complex activity 
echoes to Salais’ “State conventions” (Storper and Salais 1997; Salais 2013) 
and can be seen through the perspective of the “worlds of law” approach 
(Didry 2002, 2012).  
All of this obliges to avoid any mechanistic implementation of law, and to take 
into account the way law is produced by the legislative and the judicial activity 
that relies itself on the way ordinary people conceive law in their ordinary 
social activities. Law is a specific institution that applies to all interactions, but 
its form of implementation has impacts on the legislative activity which often 
stands on the jurisprudence, i.e. the way existing law is implemented owing to 
the selection of remarkable cases made by lawyers. 
4.  The Contributions in this HSR Special Issue 
The articles in this HSR Special Issue “Conventions and Law from a Historical 
Perspective” continue a series of issues in Historical Social Research devoted 
to EC.10 Again, this collection presents overviews, theoretical elaborations and 
empirical applications – now devoted to the conventionalist analysis of (mainly 
economic) law.11 The first article written by Rainer Diaz-Bone offers an intro-
duction and overview to EC’s contributions to the analysis of law from an 
institutionalist and methodological point of view. Claude Didry has analyzed 
new forms of labor law which emerged in the interwar period. He applies the 
theoretical concept of investment in forms to law, showing how actors learned 
                                                             
10  Starting in 2011, the HSR Special Issue “Conventions and Institutions from a Historical 
Perspective” offered introductions, theoretical considerations and empirical applications of 
this French approach (Diaz-Bone and Salais, eds.). In 2012, a follow-up HSR Focus was pub-
lished offering discussions and further considerations (Diaz-Bone and Salais, eds.). 
11  A selection of these contributions has been presented in a panel at the 2014 conference of 
the Association française d’économie politique (AFEP) at the Ecole normale supérieure de 
Cachan (Paris) on 2nd of July 2014. The panel labeled “Conventions and law from a histori-
cal perspective” presented lectures from Michela Barbot, Frédéric Marty and Claude Didry. 
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to get used to labor contracts.12 Christian Bessy also analyzes the form of labor 
contract and its history. He emphasizes its endogenous conception, and demon-
strates how one can relate different principles of justice to the dynamics of the 
labor contract leading to a “strategic use” of law in labor. Another historical 
analysis is offered by Michela Barbot on the history of property rights. She 
inspects the analysis given by NHI, and argues that important questions are left 
open from EC’s point of view, implying a more pragmatic investigation on 
mixt configurations between medieval and modern laws. Frédéric Marty fo-
cuses on the European Union. He studies the dynamics of competition law 
questioning the interpretation of an ordo-liberal convention as foundation of 
this law. He works out how conventions in competition law have switched 
under the influence of the new Chicago School. Edward Lorenz has studied the 
role of conventions in the British ship building industry. His contribution stud-
ies work coordination and the role of conventions based on work subcontract-
ing arrangements for competitiveness. Thereby, the difference of rules and 
conventions comes to the fore, a difference which is important for the analysis 
of law as well. The role of law in the creation and performance of a special 
market is studied by Lisa Knoll. She analyzes the market for CO2 emission 
rights. She highlights the constitutional role of bureaucracy for the market and 
the way CO2 emissions become more or less relevant for the firms’ manage-
ment. The British unemployment insurance and the problems to invent it, is 
reconstructed by Noel Whiteside for the time period between 1911 and 1934. 
Whiteside focusses on the role of categories of claimants, how they were estab-
lished and how they changed. Simon Deakin presents theoretical reflection on 
juridical concepts and their coevolution with social relations. He emphasizes 
the function of juridical concepts to bridge between empirical facts and legal 
norms. Robert Salais has drawn a socio-political diagnosis out of his extensive 
historical analysis of the emergence of the European Union (Salais 2013). In 
his contribution to this volume he argues about the problem of the neoliberal 
order in the European Union and the victimization of its original democratic 
project. He has identified the problem of what he calls “a-democracy,” i.e. 
forms of democracy void from any true democratic practices, and provides 
some examples such as in labor law.  
  
                                                             
12  This concept of investment in forms was early invented in EC by François Eymard-Duvernay 
and Laurent Thévenot (Eymard-Duvernay and Thévenot 1983a, 1983b; Thévenot 1984). 
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